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In this paper, I argue that demographic factors play a central role in accounting for the
trade deﬁcit experienced by the U.S. during the last three decades. The main idea is that
cross-country demographic diﬀerentials lead to adjustments in savings and investments
which are associated with international capital ﬂows towards relatively young and rapidly
growing economies. I develop a tractable two-country framework with life-cycle structure
that formalizes this intuition. The model permits to illustrate analytically and quanti-
tatively the contribution of demographic variables in determining the equilibrium trade
balance. I show that persistent diﬀerences in population aging can explain a signiﬁcant
fraction of the negative trend in the U.S. trade balance. Notably, the explicit consid-
eration of the demographic transition also helps to reconcile the dynamics of the trade
balance with the evolution of the U.S. ﬁscal deﬁcits and generates a declining pattern for
the real interest rate broadly consistent with the data.
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11 Introduction and Related Literature
The dynamics of the U.S. external position have recently received a great deal of attention
in the economic community. In 2004 the U.S. trade balance reached a record deﬁcit of more
than 5% of GDP. This ﬁgure is the result of a long run trend that is projected to continue,
at least in the near future.
The objective of this paper is to highlight the central role played by demographic factors
in explaining the U.S. trade deﬁcit during the last three decades. The results of this work
demonstrate that demographic diﬀerentials are crucial to:
1. Account for the negatively sloped trend of the U.S. trade balance.
2. Reconcile the dynamics of the trade balance with the evolution of ﬁscal deﬁcits.
3. Capture the persistent decline of the world real interest rate.
The key driving force behind these ﬁndings is the adjustment of private savings to the
demographic transition. In an economy with aging population, individuals plan for longer
retirement periods by saving more during their working years. Moreover, during retirement,
their consumption is spread over a longer period of time. If the economy is open and de-
mographic proﬁles diﬀer across countries, relative savings generate capital ﬂows that are
associated with variations in the stock of net foreign assets and trade imbalances.
For the purpose of this paper, I concentrate on the bilateral trade balance between the
United States and the other six major industrialized countries of the world economy (Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom - henceforth, the G6). The reason
for narrowing the focus on this subset of the U.S. trade partners is that the G6 feature an
economic structure that is highly comparable to the U.S. under several respects. At the same
time, however, the G6 display notable diﬀerences in terms of demographic variables, as I
illustrate more thoroughly in the next section.
The left panel of Figure 1 shows that, at least until the late 1990s, the U.S. trade balance
vis-a-vis the G6 accounted for the bulk (about 80% on average) of the total U.S. external
imbalance.1 The right panel of Figure 1 depicts the U.S. trade balance against the G6 together
1The recent departure of the U.S. trade balance series vis-a-vis the rest of the world from the series
vis-a-vis the G6 depends upon the capital ﬂows towards the U.S. from oil producers, newly developed and
emerging market economies. This aspect of the U.S. external position (the “global saving glut”, in the words of
Bernanke [2005]) is not the focus of this paper. See Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas [2005] for an explanation
of this phenomenon based on the inability of emerging market economies to generate enough reliable saving
instruments after the Asian crises of the late 1990s.
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Figure 1: the u.s. trade balance.
with its long run trend. The picture clearly identiﬁes the overall decline of the long run trend
and the negative sign which characterizes large part of the sample.
Recent contributions (Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas [2005] and Engel and Rogers [2005])
have emphasized the role of productivity growth diﬀerentials in explaining the U.S. external
deﬁcits. An explanation of the dynamics of the U.S. trade deﬁcit based on productivity
diﬀerentials requires not only current productivity growth to be higher in the U.S. than
in the rest of the world but also the expectations of future productivity diﬀerentials to be
positive and increasing. In the words of Engel and Rogers [2005], “the assumptions on future
growth in U.S. shares [of world GDP] that can explain the level in 2004 would imply that the
U.S. deﬁcit should have been even larger in earlier years”. Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas
[2005] resolve this issue by postulating permanent growth rate diﬀerentials between the U.S.
and the G6. The data, however, hardly support this assumption. Figure 2 plots diﬀerent
measures of GDP growth rates for the U.S. and the G6 during the last twenty ﬁve years.
While diﬀerences exist in various periods of the sample, and in some cases persist for few
years, the hypothesis of permanent diﬀerences appears to be quite extreme.2
This work proposes an alternative explanation for the long run trend of the U.S. exter-
2Productivity growth rate diﬀerentials likely play a prominent role in accounting for the variations in the
trade balance at higher frequencies.


































































Figure 2: gdp growth rates.
nal position based on demographic factors. The methodological contribution of the paper
is to develop a tractable open economy model with life-cycle structure that identiﬁes the
transmission mechanism and the quantitative importance of demographic variables for the
determination of the equilibrium trade balance. The resulting framework shares the basic
features of the neoclassical growth model. The only complication of considering life-cycle
behavior and non-stationary demographics derives from the presence of two extra state vari-
ables that capture the distribution of wealth across cohorts and the ratio between the number
of retirees and the number of workers.
The demographic structure assumed in this paper builds upon the formulation in Blanchard
[1985] and Weil [1989] by adding a random transition from employment to retirement, an
element of the life-cycle not present in those two studies. In Blanchard [1985], individuals
face uncertainty about their lifetime horizon but the survival probability also governs the
fertility rate. Hence, an increase in life expectancy also implies an increase in population
growth so that the aggregate size of population is constant. On the other hand, in Weil [1989],
households are inﬁnitely lived but in each period a new cohort is born so that population grows
over time. In this paper, the probability of surviving is decoupled from the population growth
rate. It is then possible to isolate the contribution of smaller population growth rates and
longer lifetime horizons in determining the equilibrium trade balance. The life-cycle transition
4from the labor force into retirement generates a reasonable pattern for aggregate savings in
response to demographic shocks. Saving diﬀerentials across countries indeed constitute the
main driving force behind the adjustment.
The explicit link between demographics and external imbalances has been previously ex-
plored in the literature. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [1996] discuss some of the basic issues in the
context of a two-period life-cycle model. The main prediction of such a framework is that
countries with higher population growth rates should display, ceteris paribus, higher saving
rates. The two-period model necessarily treats the lifetime horizon as ﬁxed (and known).
This paper instead emphasizes the importance of variable life expectancy in shaping the in-
dividual consumption-savings decisions. Countries where individuals live on average longer
are associated with higher savings rates. Since those countries also feature lower population
growth rates, the results in this paper are largely consistent with the data and reverse the
argument in the traditional life-cycle literature.3
The quantitative importance of cross-country demographic diﬀerentials on the trade balance
has recently been stressed by Henriksen [2002] and Feroli [2003] in the context of an open
economy computable overlapping generation (OLG) model.4 Domeij and Fl´ oden [2004] also
simulate an open economy OLG framework driven by demographic diﬀerentials and test the
explanatory power of the data artiﬁcially generated by the calibrated model for the time
series of the U.S. current account. Their ﬁndings are consistent with a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
demographic variables on external imbalances. The model in this paper remains considerably
more tractable than a standard OLG framework. Yet, it provides a framework that can be
employed to perform a number of numerical experiments. After illustrating analytically how
demographic factors impact the trade balance, I present a quantitative analysis that shows
how demographic forces are crucial to account for the declining trend in the U.S. trade balance
in the last three decades.
The one source of short run variation that I consider in this paper is ﬁscal policy. In the
absence of voluntary bequests, the presence of life-cycle features breaks one of the assumptions
at the core of Ricardian equivalence. Therefore, I can study the impact of ﬁscal policy
on the trade balance in an environment with time-varying demographic diﬀerentials across
countries. Fiscal deﬁcits alone lead to modest trade deﬁcits, as also recently suggested by
3Brooks [2003] considers a four-period multiregion overlapping generation model and shows that the current
demographic structure should be associated with capital ﬂows from the G7 towards developing countries. This
result also depends crucially on the ﬁxed lifetime horizon assumed in that paper.
4Both papers extend the seminal work of Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987] to a two-country setup.
5Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust [2005]. With stationary demographics, the evolution of ﬁscal policy
in the U.S. and in the G6 during the 1990s would generate counterfactual implications for the
dynamics of the U.S. external imbalance. Given the negative trend induced by demographic
diﬀerentials, ﬁscal consolidations lead to smaller improvements of the trade balance compared
to the deteriorations associated with ﬁscal expansions. The second contribution of the paper
is to show that, when demographic factors are properly considered, it is possible to reconcile
the evolution of ﬁscal deﬁcits with the dynamics of the trade balance over the entire sample
period.
Finally, the model naturally generates a decreasing pattern for the world interest rate, which
is broadly consistent with the evidence in the data. The decline of the real rate is the direct
consequence of the global excess of savings associated with population aging. This ﬁnding
carries important implications for the persistence and sustainability of ﬁscal and external
deﬁcits.5 Low interest rates increase the attractiveness of debt and lower the burden of
outstanding liabilities. In this respect, the model improves upon large strands of the existing
literature which tends to ignore the dynamics of the real interest rate.6
In the next section, I present some evidence and projections about demographic diﬀerentials
between the U.S. and the G6 and review the evolution of ﬁscal policy in the two regions. I then
describe the structure of the economy and the equilibrium for the two-country model. The
next two sections of the paper present the analytical and quantitative results. The description
of the data and the details of the analytical derivations are conﬁned to the appendix.
2 Evidence on Demographic Trends and Fiscal Policy
This section documents the evolution of the levels and diﬀerentials in demographic factors
and ﬁscal stances between the U.S. and the G6.
As portrayed in the top-left panel of Figure 3, the U.S. and the G6 have experienced a
very diﬀerent evolution of population growth rates. The growth rate has been substantially
constant (around 1%) in the U.S. ever since 1970 whereas it has progressively decreased in
5Gourinchas and Rey [2005] study the sustainability of the U.S. trade balance in light of the intertemporal
approach to the current account and emphasize valuation eﬀects associated to the rate of return. Bohn [2004]
ﬁnds evidence in favor of sustainability of the U.S. ﬁscal policy based on a test of the intertemporal government
budget constraint. The level of the interest rate plays a crucial role for both results.
6One exception is Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas [2005], who also obtain a decreasing path for the real
interest rate in their model.







































































































































Figure 3: four demographic indicators.
the G6. Available projections point in the direction of a reduction in the U.S. growth rate
starting in 2005. The declining trend is also expected to continue in the G6.
Population growth rates represent only one possible indicator of demographic trends. The
top-right panel of Figure 3 reports the years of life expectancy for the U.S. and for the G6. The
two bottom panels of Figure 3 respectively plot the dependency ratio and the fertility rates
for the two economies. The dependency ratio is deﬁned as the total number of individuals 65
years and older divided by the total number of individuals between 15 and 64 years of age.
It represents a measure of dependency of the elderly on the fraction of the total population
able to participate in the labor force.7 The fertility rates, the average number of children per
w o m a ni nag i v e ny e a r ,a l s oc o n ﬁrm the overall declining demographic trends.
Two main points emerge clearly from this picture. First, lower population growth rates
7The dynamics of the dependency ratio play a very important role for public policy decisions concerning
welfare programs. See, for instance, Attanasio, Kitao and Violante [2005] for an assessment of social security
reforms in the light of the projected demographic trends.


































































Figure 4: two measures of fiscal policy.
and faster population aging is a phenomenon that concerns the U.S. as well as the G6.
Second, the diﬀerentials in demographic indicators, which were quite small at the beginning
of the 1970s, have become more pronounced during the last two decades and are projected to
remain as such at least until 2050, with the G6 ahead of the U.S. by several decades. Both
considerations turn out to be important for the quantitative analysis in this paper.
The second piece of evidence that I present in this section covers the evolution of the total
government balance and the stock of net government debt from 1980 until 2004. As mentioned
in the introduction, demographic trends are crucial in this paper to reconcile the idea that
ﬁscal deﬁcits entail external imbalances (the twin-deﬁcits hypothesis) with the puzzling fact
that the U.S. ﬁscal consolidation that took place in the 1990s was accompanied only by an
initial small correction in the trade deﬁcit followed by a fast deterioration thereafter. The
key question in the debate about Ricardian equivalence and the real eﬀects of ﬁscal policy
is whether ﬁnancing a certain level of spending with taxes or debt matters for aggregate
consumption. For this reason, I concentrate on ﬁscal deﬁcits and government debt rather
than on government spending.8
Figure 4 reports the total government balance (left) and the net government debt (right)
8A constant ratio of government spending to GDP is also roughly consistent with the evidence for G7
countries.
8for the U.S. and for the G6 as a fraction of their GDP levels. Both panels suggest a split of
the sample in three parts. The ﬁrst period corresponds to the 1980s and early 1990s. In those
years, the U.S. was running a relatively expansionary ﬁscal policy. Fiscal deﬁcits were on
average about two percentage points higher than in the G6 and net government debt doubled
to reach 60% in 1993. The second period roughly covers the 1990s. The main feature of that
decade is the ﬁscal consolidation that took place in the U.S. and the increase in government
debt in the G6. Beginning in 2000, ﬁscal policy in the U.S. has been again on an expansionary
path relative to the G6. The rapid turnaround in the government balance has ﬁnally brought
the U.S. deﬁcit to the levels of the G6 at the end 2004.
The data highlight two regularities. First, ﬁscal stances follow similar patterns in the two
regions, with two periods of expansion in the 1980s and during the last ﬁve years, spaced out
by the consolidation of the 1990s. Second, the diﬀerentials for both deﬁcits and debt levels
appear to be small in magnitude. These two observations constitute the key aspects of ﬁscal
policy for the following analysis.
3 A Life-Cycle Model of the U.S. and the G6
In this section, I set up a two-country world economy in which agents exhibit life-cycle
behavior. An open economy represents the natural framework to think about the eﬀects of
demographics on the trade balance. A two-country model reveals particularly appropriate
t ot h ee x t e n tt h a tt h eU . S .a n dt h eG 6a r et w om a j o rp l a y e r si nt h ew o r l de c o n o m ya n d
is also instrumental to discuss the link between demographic factors and the real interest
rate. Finally, the life-cycle structure not only naturally captures the key elements of the
demographic transition but it also permits to consider non-Ricardian eﬀects of ﬁscal policy.
The main diﬀerence with respect to the existing literature on computable life-cycle models
concerns the tractability of the framework. I present a model in which the heterogeneity
implicit in the life-cycle can be summarized by two state variables, the distribution of assets
between retirees and workers and the ratio between the number of individuals in those two
groups. This formulation adds life-cycle behavior on top of a basic structure close to the work
of Blanchard [1985] and Weil [1989]. The framework is tractable enough to derive a closed
form solution for aggregate consumption given prices, along the same lines of Gertler [1999].
This result is crucial to describe the basic mechanisms that underlie the eﬀect of demographic
factors on the trade balance.
The world is composed of two countries, Home (the U.S.) and Foreign (the G6), initially
9identical in all respects. I describe in details the structure of the Home economy. Whenever
necessary, I refer to Foreign variables with an asterisk “∗”. At time t, the Home country is
populated by a continuum of agents of mass Nt. The commodity space is constituted by a
single consumption good which can be traded internationally at no shipping cost and serves
as numeraire. There is no aggregate uncertainty. All agents have perfect foresight but can
be surprised by unexpected exogenous shocks.
Individuals are born workers (denoted by the superscript w) and retire with probability
ω, which I assume to be ﬁxed throughout the analysis. Once a retiree (denoted by the
superscript r), an individual survives from period t to period t + 1 with probability γt,t+1.
The number of workers in period t is Nw
t . I ne a c hp e r i o d( 1− ω + nt,t+1)Nw
t individuals
(workers) are born. The law of motion for the aggregate labor force is
Nw




so that nt,t+1 represents the growth rate of the labor force between period t and t +1 . T h e
number of retirees is denoted by Nr
t and evolves over time according to
Nr
t+1 =( 1− ω)Nw
t + γt,t+1Nr
t . (2)
The ratio between the number of retirees and the number of workers, deﬁned as ψt ≡ Nr
t /N w
t ,
summarizes the heterogeneity in the population. The variable ψt is called “dependency ratio”
and follows a law of motion that can be derived from expression [2] after dividing both sides
by Nw
t and rearranging using [1]
(1 + nt,t+1)ψt+1 =( 1− ω)+γt,t+1ψt. (3)





















If population growth rates and surviving probabilities are constant, the dependency ratio is





The number of retirees relative to the number of worker depends positively on the probability
of surviving and negatively on the probability of retirement and on the growth rate of the
labor force. Under stationary demographics, from [4] and [5], it follows that the number of
retirees Nr
t and the total population Nt grow at the same rate as the number of workers Nw
t ,
which is equal to n.
Workers supply inelastically one unit of labor and retirees do not work.9 Individual pref-
erences belong to the recursive non-expected utility family, originally introduced by Kreps
and Porteus [1978] and extended by Epstein and Zin [1989] to an inﬁnite horizon framework.


















t denotes consumption and V z
t stands for the value of utility in period t. The discount






βγt,t+1 if z = r
β if z = w
The preferences in [7] feature the well-known property of separating intertemporal substitu-
tion from risk-aversion. The parameter ρ measures intertemporal substitution. In particular,
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is given by σ ≡ 1/(1 − ρ). On the other hand, the
parameter α captures risk aversion. More speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
is equal to 1 − α.
The expectation of Vt+1 diﬀers across cohorts because the future value of utility depends
on the current employment status. In particular, a worker remains in the labor force with
probability ω a n dr e t i r e sw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1−ω. The resulting expression for the expectation
9It is possible to relax both these assumptions without sacriﬁcing the analytical tractability of the model.
See Gertler [1999] for details.






















¢α if z = w
The fact that the probability of retirement and death are independent of age makes it
possible to consider the problem of a generic individual within each cohort without speciﬁc
reference to her age or to her retirement period. In what follows, I discuss two additional
assumptions that keep the model analytically tractable and greatly facilitate aggregation.
The idiosyncratic uncertainty about the lifetime horizon is eliminated by assuming the
existence of a perfect annuity market in which retirees can fully insure against the risk of
death. Retirees turn their wealth over to a perfectly competitive mutual fund industry which
invests the proceeds and pays back a premium over the market return to compensate for the
probability of death.10 For a retiree who survives between period t − 1a n dt,t h er e t u r no n
a one dollar investment is RW,t/γt−1,t,w h e r eRW,t is the world interest rate that clears the
international capital markets. The extra-return over the market rate compensates for the
probability of death.
The idiosyncratic uncertainty about employment tenure is limited by imposing that house-
holds are risk-neutral with respect to variations in income. To this extent, I set α =1i n
[7]. For a given level of the interest rate, only average consumption tomorrow (appropriately
weighted) matters for current consumption decisions.
The assumption of perfect insurance markets against the risk of death is quite common in
the literature (see, for instance, Yaari [1965] and Blanchard [1985]). A similar mechanism
to insure against labor income ﬂuctuations would smooth consumption perfectly across work
and retirement, hence shutting oﬀ the life-cycle channel which is at the very heart of the
analysis. On the other hand, the assumption of risk neutrality, while still allowing for an
arbitrary elasticity of substitution σ, mitigates the artiﬁcially high degree of labor income
ﬂuctuations induced by the constant transition probability into retirement.
I now turn to characterizing the consumption-savings problem for each cohort. I present
the problem of a generic worker ﬁrst and then the problem of a generic retiree.
10It is convenient to assume that in each country the mutual fund operates at the national level only.
The reason is that, in the presence of cross-country diﬀerences in aging proﬁle, no arbitrage would imply
equalization of returns in the insurance market but not in the capital market. Since the mutual fund industry
is a device to keep the model tractable, the restriction in international insurance markets appears to be
appropriate.
12Workers. Individuals are born workers and start their life with zero assets. A generic
worker i chooses consumption Cw
t (i)a n da s s e t sAw
t+1 (i)t os o l v e
V w














t (i)+Wt − Tw
t − Cw
t (i), (9)
where Wt represents the market wage and Tw
t is the total amount of lump-sum taxes paid
by a single worker. The function V r
t+1 (i)( d e ﬁned below) enters the continuation value of a
worker to discount the possibility that retirement occurs between time t and t +1 .
Retirees. Ar e t i r e ej chooses consumption Cr
t (j) and assets Ar
t (j)t os o l v e
V r


















There is no public pension scheme and the only source of income for retirees is ﬁnancial
wealth.11
Firms. Firms operate in perfect competition using a constant returns to scale technology





where α ∈ (0,1) is the labor share and Xt stands for exogenous labor-augmenting productivity
which grows at the constant rate x. In order to be consistent with the notation adopted so far,
I assume that households own the capital stock but that ﬁrms bear the cost of depreciation
δ.
Government. The government levies lump-sum taxes and issues one-period debt Bt+1 to
ﬁnance a given amount of spending Gt according to the ﬂow budget constraint
Bt+1 = RW,tBt + Gt − Tt, (13)
11Gertler [1999] studies the eﬀects of moving from a public to private pension system in a closed economy
with the life-cycle structure adopted in this model.
13where Tt = Nw
t Tw
t represents the total tax revenues.
The Foreign country has a completely symmetric structure.
4 Equilibrium in the World Economy
The environment is competitive and all agents take prices as given. Formally, a competitive
equilibrium is a sequence of quantities and prices such that in each country (i) households
maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, (ii) ﬁrms maximize proﬁts subject to their
technology constraint, (iii) the government chooses a path for taxes and debt, compatible with
intertemporal solvency, to ﬁnance an exogenous level of total spending, (iv) goods and asset
markets clear at the world level.
I can now describe in details the equations that constitute the competitive equilibrium.
Again, the focus is on the Home country. For simplicity, I start from the problem of a retiree.
As demonstrated by Farmer [1990], under the assumption of risk neutrality in preferences [7],
the solution of the individual problem consists of an explicit decision rule for consumption,















The crucial point of equation [15] is that the marginal propensity to consume for a retiree is
independent of individual characteristics. Indeed, the evolution of ξt is governed only by the
world interest rate (an aggregate variable) and the probability to survive (identical across
retirees).
The solution for the problem of a worker can be characterized along similar lines. Workers





where πt is the marginal propensity to consume for a worker. As for retirees, from the Euler
12The details of the derivation are provided in the appendix. See also Backus, Routledge and Zin [2004] for
a discussion of other examples in the literature.
14equation, it is possible to retrieve the law of motion of the workers’ marginal propensity to
consume




where Ωt ≡ ω+(1− ω) 
1
1−σ
t and  t ≡ ξt/πt are two additional variables that link the marginal
propensities to consume of the two cohorts.13 Also for workers, the marginal propensity
to consume only depends on aggregate or cohort-speciﬁc variables but not on individual
characteristics. The variable Hw
t (i) in [16] represents the present discounted value of current
















The term Ωt+1RW,t+1/ω constitutes the eﬀective discount rate for a worker. The ﬁrst com-
ponent of the higher discounting captures the eﬀect of the ﬁnite lifetime horizon (less value
attached to the future). The actual discount factor is also increased by the term ω which
induces higher savings to ﬁnance consumption during the retirement period (positive proba-
bility of retiring). I now proceed to derive the aggregate consumption function.
The ﬁrst step consists of aggregating consumption by cohort, which is possible because in-
dividuals within the same cohort share the same marginal propensity to consume. Aggregate










t (i)di for workers.





t is total wealth that retirees carry from period t − 1i n t op e r i o dt, with aggregate
return given by RW,t.14
Individual consumption for workers can be aggregated along the same lines to yield
Cw
t = πt (RW,tAw
t + Ht), (20)
13In the appendix, I formally show that   and Ω are both larger than one in steady state. For plausible
parameter choices, including the calibration adopted in the numerical experiment section, this result holds
also outside the steady state. The fact that  t > 1 implies that the marginal propensity to consume is higher
for retirees than for workers. As the next section clariﬁes, this result constitutes a key element to understand
the response of consumption and savings to changes in demographic factors.
14Each individual retiree earns a return given by RW,t/γt−1,t but only a fraction γt−1,t of retirees survive
between two periods.
15where Aw
t is total aggregate ﬁnancial wealth held by workers. The aggregate value of human
wealth evolves according to
Ht = Nw




The second step consists of writing the aggregate consumption function Ct as the sum of
[19] and [20]. I denote by λt ≡ Ar
t/At the share of total assets At held by retirees. It follows
that the aggregate consumption function
Ct = πt [(1 − λt)RW,tAt + Ht +  tλtRW,tAt]. (22)
Finally, I need to characterize the evolution of the distribution of assets, as captured by
λt. This additional state variable keeps track of the heterogeneity in wealth accumulation
introduced by the life-cycle hypothesis. Aggregate assets for retirees depend on the total
savings of those who are retired in period t but also on the total savings of the fraction of




t +( 1− ω)(RW,tAw
t + Nw
t Wt − Tt − Cw
t ). (23)
Aggregate assets for workers depend only the savings of the fraction of workers who remain




t Wt − Tt − Cw
t ). (24)
After substituting expressions [19] and [24] into [23], I exploit the deﬁnition of λt to obtain
the law of motion for the distribution of wealth across cohorts
λt+1At+1 =( 1− ω)At+1 + ω(1 − ξt)RW,tλtAt. (25)
Expression [25] relates the evolution of the distribution of wealth λt to the aggregate asset
position At.
The problem of the ﬁrm is standard. Firms hire labor to the point that the real wage equals






The investment decisions are consistent with the condition that the marginal product of
capital, net of depreciation, equals the real return that prevails in the international asset
16markets
RW,t =( 1− α)
Yt
Kt
+( 1− δ). (27)
Finally, in equilibrium, the government is bound to choose combinations of taxes and debt









The current value of debt (principal and interests) must be equal to the present discounted
value of current and future primary surpluses. For later purposes, it is also convenient to
express ﬁscal policy variables as fractions of GDP. Given the path for Gt,Ia s s u m et h a tt h e
government ﬁxes the ratio gt ≡ Gt/Yt and chooses combinations of tax rates τt ≡ Tt/Yt and
debt-to-GDP ratios bt ≡ Bt/Yt that satisfy [28].
So far, I have described the behavior of the private sector and of the government of the Home
country. The Foreign country is characterized by a similar set of relations. I now complete
the characterization of the equilibrium by discussing how the asset and goods markets clear.
The portfolio of assets held by the private sector is composed by capital, government bonds
and net foreign assets
At = Kt + Bt + Ft. (29)
The diﬀerence between production Yt and domestic absorption (Ct + It + Gt)d e ﬁnes net
export as
NXt = Yt − (Ct + It + Gt), (30)
where investment is given by
Kt+1 = It +( 1− δ)Kt. (31)
The evolution of net foreign assets links the goods and the asset markets together. Net foreign
assets represent the payment received from the rest of the world in exchange for exporting
17goods.15 Hence, Ft evolves according to
Ft+1 = RW,tFt + NXt. (32)
International capital ﬂows equalize the return RW,t across countries. The model is closed by
the equation that characterizes the equilibrium in the market for international debt
Ft + F∗
t =0 .
Despite the tractability of the model, a complete closed form solution cannot be derived.
In the appendix, I characterize a symmetric steady state of the model in which exogenous
variables are constant and equal across countries. Given the presence of exogenous growth,
quantities are not stationary. A steady state with balanced growth exists for detrended
variables, that is, for variable expressed in terms of eﬃciency units XtNw
t . In such a steady
state, quantities grow at the constant rate (1 + x)(1+n) ∼ = 1+x + n.I n w h a t f o l l o w s , I
denote a generic variable Zt in terms of eﬃciency units by lower case letters zt ≡ Zt/(XtNw
t ).
The solution for the steady state and for the transition dynamics is obtained by employing a
non-linear Newton method.16 In order to have a determinate steady state, I calibrate from
the data an initial level of steady state government debt relative to GDP as the “ﬁscal rule”
which closes the model.
As a ﬁnal remark, it is interesting to note that in this model the steady state is determi-
nate.17 The life-cycle structure pins down endogenously the steady state value of net foreign
asset. Ghironi [2003] shows a similar result in a framework with overlapping families of
inﬁnitely lived agents based on Weil [1989].
15Following Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ [1996], the current account balance can be deﬁned as the one-period vari-
ation in the net foreign asset position
CAt ≡ Ft+1 − Ft =( RW,t − 1)Ft + NXt.
For the U.S., the current account and trade balance essentially coincide, which means that the net interest
rate payment on the outstanding stock of net foreign assets must be small. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2001]
and Gourinchas and Rey [2005], among others, discuss extensively these valuation eﬀects.
16See Juillard [1996] for details about the implementation of the speciﬁc Newton-Raphson algorithm used
to solve the model.
17It is well known that open economy models with incomplete markets generally feature steady state in-
determinacy and non-stationary dynamics of net foreign assets. See Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe [2003] for the
discussion of a number of alternative mechanisms to circumvent this problem.
185 The Determinants of the Trade Balance
The analytical tractability of the life-cycle framework presented in the previous two sections
allows to isolate the determinants of the trade balance and to sort out precisely the equilibrium
eﬀect of demographic factors and ﬁscal policy on each component.
The assumption of perfect ﬁnancial market integration implies that in each period capital
in eﬃciency units must be equal across countries. The result follows from the no arbitrage
relation
RW,t − 1+δ =( 1− α)(kt)
−α =( 1− α)(k∗
t)
−α , (33)
which entails kt = k∗
t,∀t. Since both countries have access to the same technology, also output
per eﬃciency unit is equalized across borders (yt = y∗
t). Assuming that gt = g∗
t, the national





(cR,t + iR,t), (34)
where for any zt and z∗
t,Id e ﬁne zR,t ≡ zt − z∗
t.
From [22] and its Foreign counterpart, relative consumption is
cR,t = RW,t {[πt (1 − λt)at − π∗
t (1 − λ∗
t)a∗
t]+( ξtλtat − ξ∗
tλ∗
ta∗
t)} +( πtht − π∗
th∗
t)( 3 5 )
The ﬁrst two components of [35] represent the diﬀerentials in the propensity to consume
out of ﬁnancial wealth by workers and retirees respectively. The third term captures the
diﬀerentials in the propensity to consume out of human wealth.
From [31] and its Foreign country counterpart, the equality of the capital stock in eﬃciency







I begin by highlighting the eﬀects of population aging on the trade balance. For the sake
of simplicity, it is useful to think of this experiment in isolation, holding constant population
growth rates and government debt at their initial steady state values. In the absence of
population growth rate diﬀerentials, iR,t =0 . F r o m[ 3 4 ] ,s a v i n g sd i ﬀerentials completely
18In what follows, I refer to cR,t also as (the negative of) relative savings. The result is a consequence of
the deﬁnition of aggregate savings as investment plus the trade rather than the current account balance.





The adjustment of the trade balance to a change in the degree of population aging de-
pends primarily on the response of the marginal propensities to consume. Diﬀerent marginal
propensities to consume within the same cohort across countries reﬂect diﬀerent degrees of
population aging between the Home and the Foreign economy.
In the model, the eﬀects of population aging can be studied in relation to variations in
the probabilities of survival γ and γ∗. In steady state, the relative marginal propensity to
consume for retirees is
ξR = −βσRσ−1
W (γ − γ∗).
Faster aging in one country is associated with a relatively more pronounced decrease in the
marginal propensity to consume. While population aging also entails general equilibrium
eﬀects on the world interest rate, aging diﬀerentials only aﬀect relative savings.
The eﬀect of aging on the relative marginal propensity to consume for workers propagates









In the appendix, I show formally that, for a given interest rate, a higher surviving probability
induces a reduction in the marginal propensity to consume for workers too. As before,
diﬀerent surviving probabilities across countries only inﬂuence relative savings.
Intuitively, an increase in the expected lifetime horizon brings about two eﬀects. First,
an individual who is in the labor force at the moment of the shock increases her savings to
ﬁnance a longer retirement period. Second, after retirement, agents spread their consumption
over an extended period. While it is still true that the marginal propensity to consume is
higher for a retiree than for a worker, the consumption level of both cohorts decreases as
compared to before the shock. Most importantly, in relative terms, the level of savings is
higher in the country with higher life expectancy. The relative excess of savings generates
a trade surplus associated with the accumulation of a positive stock of net foreign assets.
The life-cycle structure of the population is at the core of this mechanism. The diﬀerence
in the marginal propensities to consume is a result of the heterogeneity between workers
and retirees. Despite the assumptions made to limit the degree of heterogeneity within each
cohort and maintain analytical tractability, the model still preserves the key ingredients of
20standard life-cycle frameworks and provides a transparent illustration of the forces at work.
Alongside the eﬀects on the marginal propensity to consume, a higher probability of survival
also increases the dependency ratio. From [6], in steady state, the cross-country diﬀerential
is
ψR =
(1 − ω)(γ − γ∗)
(1 + n − γ)(1+n − γ∗)
.
Quite obviously, the dependency ratio is higher in the country with longer life expectancy.
Since retirees have a higher marginal propensity to consume relative to workers, over time
this eﬀect partly oﬀsets the initial fall of aggregate consumption. Nonetheless, for plausi-
ble parameterizations, the reduction of the marginal propensity to consume among retirees
dominates the cross-sectional adjustment within each country.
Finally, the excess of total savings generates a drop in the interest rate. The absolute drop
depends on the overall change in the lifetime horizon. In particular, the longer the retirement
period, the larger the eﬀect on workers and retirees savings. The eﬀect of population aging
appears to be crucial to explain the declining trend in the real interest rate during the last
twenty ﬁve years.
I shall now discuss the impact of population growth rate diﬀerentials. As for the previous
experiments, it is useful to ﬁx the other sources of variations, in this case ﬁscal deﬁcits and
population aging, at their initial steady state values. In steady state, total population Nt
grows at the same rate as the labor force Nw
t . During the transition, the link between the




(1 + nt,t+1)+( 1− ω)+γψt
1+ψt
.
The primitive shocks for this experiment are the labor force growth rates in the two countries
(n and n∗).
The direct channel of transmission of population growth rate diﬀerentials operates through
the investment sector. From equation [36], a smaller population growth rate in one region
shifts relative investment towards the rest of the world. The no arbitrage relation [33] repre-
sents the driving force behind this adjustment. In frictionless international ﬁnancial markets,
the rate of return must be equal across countries. Capital ﬂows towards the region with
a relatively larger pool of workers ensure no arbitrage opportunities by employing capital
where it is relatively more productive.19 If, for example, the Home country labor force grows
19The importance of this channel depends on the assumption about the degree of capital mobility across
countries. For example, the presence of adjustment costs in investment would limit the transmission of
population growth rates shocks.
21at a relatively higher rate, Foreign capital relocates to the more productive Home ﬁrms, in
exchange for a claim on ownership. This mechanism results in an accumulation of net foreign
debt by Home households and a negative trade balance (nxt < 0).
The presence of life-cycle behavior partly acts to counterbalance the investment channel.
A smaller growth rate of the labor force at time t also implies an increase in the dependency
ratio, which in turn leads to a reduction of the total population growth rate at t+1. Holding
ﬁxed the probability of survival, aggregate consumption increases because retirees become
relatively more numerous. In the absence of population aging, the marginal propensities to
consume for both cohorts are equal across countries. While the general equilibrium eﬀect of
a shock to population growth rates on the interest rate reduces the marginal propensities to
consume for both cohorts, the marginal propensity to consume for retirees rises relative to
workers.
The sign of the net adjustment (investment versus consumption-saving decisions) is am-
biguous. The numerical experiments in the next section suggest a mild predominance of the
investment channel but the overall eﬀect appears to be rather small.
Lastly, I consider the eﬀects of ﬁscal deﬁcits on the trade balance. In what follows, I shut
oﬀ any demographic diﬀerential across countries. For the sake of the argument, it is also
convenient to set the population growth rate equal to zero.20 In such circumstances, the





The absence of life expectancy diﬀerentials implies that the marginal propensity to consume
for each cohort is identical across countries. Expression [35] can be rewritten as
cR,t = πt [hR,t + RW,taR,t +(  t − 1)RW,t (λtat − λ∗
ta∗
t)]. (37)










The second term of [37] is the gross return on the relative aggregate asset position. From
20This assumption permits to illustrate more starkly the non-Ricardian eﬀects associated to ﬁscal policy in
this framework. Weil [1989] shows that a positive population growth rate (overlapping families of inﬁnitely
lived agents) is a suﬃcient condition for Ricardian equivalence to fail in an otherwise neoclassical world.
22expression [28] and [29], I can rewrite








Equation [39] follows from the fact that capital in eﬃciency units is equal across countries
and that the Home and Foreign net foreign asset positions add up to zero. Finally, the third
element of [37] captures relative asset holdings by retirees (remember that λt = Ar
t/At). From
expression [25], this diﬀerence evolves according to
λtat − λ∗
ta∗












In general, relative asset holdings by retirees can be expressed as a function of the cross-
country diﬀerence in aggregate assets.21
The solution for the trade balance in the absence of cross-country demographic diﬀerentials
clariﬁes the channel through which ﬁscal deﬁcits inﬂuence the trade balance. Starting from a
symmetric steady state, consider, for example, the case of a relative ﬁscal deﬁcit in the Home
country. This experiment corresponds to an increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio bt holding
constant the level of spending, so that the tax rate τt is reduced during the expansion. In
this scenario, on impact, the trade balance depends only on future relative tax rates. Since
the Home country is running a ﬁscal deﬁcit, the relative tax rate is negative, boosting relative
human wealth and turning the trade balance into a deﬁcit. As time goes by, the tax rate in
the Home country increases in order to smooth the tax hike that takes place at the end of
the ﬁscal expansion. Along the transition, the tax cut stimulates private consumption and
reduces private savings. In general equilibrium, the drop of the savings rate increases the real
interest rate. This eﬀect partially limits the beneﬁts of the ﬁscal expansion on consumption.
Fiscal deﬁcits entail non-Ricardian eﬀects because of the life-cycle structure of the economy.
In expressions [38] and [39], relative taxes are discounted at diﬀerent rates. In other words, a
fraction of government debt constitutes net wealth for the private sector. Because of transition
into retirement, a worker who beneﬁts from a tax cut today, with some probability, will not
be subject to the future higher tax rate, which is necessary, ceteris paribus, to satisfy the
21Whether expression [40] admits a backward or forward solution depends on the autoregressive coeﬃcient
being larger or smaller than one. Fiscal and demographic forces will typically exert opposite eﬀects on this
term. For high enough values of the equilibrium interest rate, possibly due to expansionary ﬁscal policies, the
autoregressive coeﬃcient will be larger than one so that only current and future ﬁscal decisions matter for the
equilibrium trade balance.
23government intertemporal solvency condition. Hence, the capitalization of future tax rates
by workers is less than complete (as measured by the factor Ωt+v/ω). In this case, ﬁscal and
trade deﬁcits are “twins”, although the synchronization is less than perfect. The persistence
in the trade deﬁcit is augmented by the term in [40], which measures the variation in the
distribution of wealth across cohorts following an expansion and is peculiar of the life-cycle
structure of the economy.
As a ﬁnal remark, when ω = 1, the setup encompasses the standard inﬁnite horizon model
with a representative agent. Under this limiting case, agents never retire so that λt = λ∗
t =0 .
Since also Ωt =1∀t, Ricardian equivalence holds and the trade balance is only a function of
the (relative) level of public spending, not of the ﬁnancing decisions (debt versus taxes).
6 A Quantitative Investigation of the U.S. Trade Deﬁcit
In this section, I evaluate the quantitative signiﬁcance of the diﬀerent eﬀects discussed above.
The objective is to assess the overall contribution and the relative importance of demographic
factors and ﬁscal deﬁcits in accounting for the evolution of the U.S. trade balance vis-a-vis
the G6 after the breakdown of Bretton Woods. The application of the theoretical apparatus
developed so far leads to three main results:
1. The demographic diﬀerentials between the U.S. and the G6 explain the declining trend
of the U.S. trade deﬁcit in the last three decades.
2. The consideration of demographic factors reconciles the evolution of ﬁscal policy in the
U.S. and in the G6 with the dynamics of the trade balance.
3. The demographic transition generates a path of the world real interest rate broadly
consistent with the data.
The time period is one year. The demographic transition starts in 1970 and convergence
f o rp o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hr a t e s 22 occurs in 2030. The choice of 1970 as the base year depends
upon two facts. First, the assumption of perfect capital markets appears to be the most
appropriate for the period after the collapse of Bretton Woods in the early 1970s. Second, in
those same years, demographic diﬀerentials between the U.S. and the G6 were also minimal.
It seems then reasonable to start from a symmetric steady state in which trade is balanced and
22In order to avoid that, in the limit, one country ends up representing the entire world economy, I consider
convergence to a steady state in which both regions grow at the same rate.
24evaluate the impact of ﬁscal deﬁcits and demographics without adjustment eﬀects induced
by an existing stock of assets or liabilities. In the section on robustness, I discuss alternative
initial steady states as well as diﬀerent convergence scenarios.
Initial Steady State. The calibration of the demographic variables is based on previous
studies and on data from the United Nations World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision.
Population grows at a rate of 1%, which is in line with the observed value for both regions
in 1970. Individuals are assumed to enter the economy as workers at the age of 20 and work
on average (1 − ω)
−1 years. I choose the parameter ω =0 .9778 to match a 45-year average
permanence in the labor force, which corresponds to the working period used by Auerbach
and Kotlikoﬀ [1987]. I set the surviving probability for a retiree (γ)e q u a lt o0 .8, in order to
match the average expected lifetime horizon of an agent in the model (65+(1 − γ)
−1)t ot h e
empirical counterpart in 1970, which was roughly 70 years both for the U.S. and G6.
The choice of the values for preference and production parameters is mostly in line with the
existing literature. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ is assumed to be equal to
0.5, which represents a compromise between the values usually adopted in the public ﬁnance
literature (e.g. Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ [1987]) and in the real business cycle literature (e.g.
Cooley [1995]).23 The discount factor β is set residually equal to one24 in order to obtain a
real interest rate of 5% in 1970. The production parameters take values in line with the real
business cycle literature. The labor share α is assumed to be 2/3, the depreciation rate δ is
set to 6% and technology grows at 1%.
Throughout the analysis, I focus on the government ﬁnancing decisions of a constant level of
public expenditure. I ﬁx the ratio of government spending to GDP to 20%, which corresponds
approximately to the average U.S. value during the post-war period,25 as reported by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. The ratio of government debt to GDP is calibrated using data
on net debt from the International Monetary Fund (World Economic Outlook Database),
which are available only starting in 1980. I set the ratio of debt to GDP in the initial
symmetric steady state to 26%, which represents the average between U.S. and G6 in 1980.
For the U.S., this value represents a reasonable approximation also for the 1970s, a decade
23See Attanasio [1999] for a comprehensive survey.
24A value of the subjective discount factor equal to one is consistent with the estimates in Hurd [1989].
25This value obviously underestimates the role of government spending in European countries and Japan.
However, the model excludes features, such as a public pension system or a public health system, which account
for large parts of government spending in those countries and are likely to provide utility to households. Hence,
the value of 20% seems a reasonable approximation in a context in which government spending is considered
pure waste.
25during which the ratio of net debt to GDP was roughly constant.26 In the baseline experiment,
I assume that the ratio of debt to GDP is constant at 26% also in the G6 throughout the
1970s. In the section on robustness, I consider an extended time series for the G6 extrapolated
from gross government debt as reported by the OECD Economic Outlook Database.
Table 1. initial symmetric steady state
n 1% population growth rate
(1 − ω)
−1 45 avg. working period (years)
(1 − γ)
−1 5 avg. retirement period (years)
β 1 subjective discount factor
σ 0.5 elasticity of intertemporal substitution
α 2/3 labor share
δ 6% depreciation rate
x 1% growth rate of technology
g 20% government spending (% of gdp)
b 26% government debt (% of gdp)
Given the benchmark calibration, the model delivers a capital-income ratio equal to 3 in
the initial steady state. Investment constitutes 24% of GDP and the tax rate is equal to
20.8%.
Final Steady State. The transition from the initial to the ﬁnal steady state is governed by
the evolution of demographic factors (expected lifetime horizons and population growth rates)
and of ﬁscal stances (debt-to-GDP ratios) in both countries. Convergence for population
growth rates occurs in 2030 at a value equal to 0.2%, in the baseline experiment, which
coincides with the average of the U.N. projections for the U.S. and the G6 for the period
2030 − 2050. The U.N. projections also constitute the anchor for the lifetime expectancy in
both regions in the same period. The implied values of the average retirement period are 15
and 18 years for the U.S. and G6 respectively. For debt-to-GDP ratios, I use the projected
values for 2006 from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database, approximately equal to
50% in the U.S. and 70% in the G6.
26Data on net debt for the U.S. are available also from the Congressional Budget Oﬃce for the entire post war
period. While the pattern is essentially the same, there exist some diﬀerences in terms of absolute magnitudes,
although the order never exceeds 5%. For international comparisons, the World Economic Outlook Database
appears to be the most reliable source for the time series of net debt.
26Table 2. final steady state
u.s. g6
n 0.2% 0.2% population growth rate
(1 − γ)
−1 15 18 avg. retirement period (years)
b 50% 70% government debt (% of gdp)
The Experiment. The central numerical experiment of the paper consists of simulating
an unexpected shock to demographic variables and ﬁscal stances in 1970 and to compute the
transition path to the ﬁnal steady state, which is reached in 2030. Under perfect foresight,
agents are surprised by the shock in the initial period but perfectly anticipate the evolution of
the exogenous variables thereafter. I discuss the likely implications of this assumption below.
I use the realized values of net debt as a percentage of GDP in the two countries as the
exogenous ﬁscal stances in the simulation. Given the constant level of government spending
as a fraction of output, the tax rate and the government surplus are an outcome of the model
which depends on the equilibrium output and interest rate. I compute the probability of
surviving from the data on life expectancy under the assumption that the average permanence
in the labor force is constant at 45 years. Finally, I infer the growth rate of the labor force
from the data on population growth rates, adjusting for convergence in 2030 at 0.2%.
Results. Figure 5 compares the series of the trade balance as percentage of GDP generated
by the model with the trend of the HP-ﬁltered series of the U.S. trade balance vis-a-vis the
G6 for the period 1980 − 2004.
The time series of the trade balance exhibits three key periods. The ﬁrst segment, which
includes the ﬁrst “dip” in the trend, begins in the early 1980s and lasts for slightly less than
a decade. The second part of the series covers the years from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s
and is characterized by a small reduction in the trade deﬁcit. Finally, the third period, which
approximately starts in the second part of the 1990s and continues as of today, displays a
further worsening of the trade deﬁcit towards 2% of GDP.
The model performs reasonably well to explain the long run movements of the U.S. trade
balance vis-a-vis the G6. It captures the overall declining trend, the prolonged period of
sustained deﬁcits and the key swings in the last twenty ﬁve years. The fraction of the trend
explained by the model reduces over time but this aspect is most likely associated with the
assumption of perfect foresight which leads to a more pronounced adjustment at the beginning
of the experiment.



































THE U.S. TRADE BALANCE: MODEL SIMULATION vs. LOW FREQUENCY COMPONENT
MODEL
DATA (TREND)
Figure 5: t h eu . s .t r a d eb a l a n c e-s i m u l a t i o na n dd a t a( t r e n d ) .
The central argument of the paper revolves around the decomposition of the simulated trade
balance series, reported in Figure 6. I repeatedly shut oﬀ all but one source of variation and
compute the trade balance implied by the model under the a single shock. In what follows,
I discuss the two main results of this exercise and I complete the analysis with the general
equilibrium implications of the demographic transition.
Result #1. Demographic diﬀerentials explain the negative trend of the U.S. trade balance.
The demographic transition generates the negative trend of the trade balance observed in
the data. As illustrated by Figure 6, the diﬀerentials in life expectancy account for most of
the adjustment.
The intuition behind these eﬀects hinges upon the discussion of the previous section. The
response to the observed demographic transition requires the Home country to run a persistent
trade deﬁcit that accommodates the excess of savings ﬂowing in from the rest of the world.
While aging and smaller growth are a global phenomenon, the cross-country diﬀerentials are
the key determinant of the equilibrium trade balance. In the Foreign country, workers save
relatively more to cope with a longer retirement period and retirees spread their consumption
over a relatively longer horizon.
The simulation also shows that the strength of the investment channel by itself is quan-
titatively limited. On the one hand, capital ﬂows towards the Home country where it is








































































































































Figure 6: the determinants of the trade balance.
relatively more productive. On the other hand, however, holding constant life expectancy,
smaller population growth rates reduce savings in the Foreign country.
In the case of variable surviving probability, a smaller population growth rate interacts
with population aging to the extent that both eﬀects push the dependency ratio in the same
direction. The number of retirees grows relatively to the number of workers because (i) the
average lifetime horizon is longer (aging) and (ii) less people are born in each period (growth).
The combination of these two forces leads to a drop in the marginal propensities to consume
which is stronger for the economy experiencing a more dramatic demographic transition.
Overall, the negative trend in the Home country trade balance is the result of demographic
diﬀerentials that persist over time.
Result #2. Fiscal policy ampliﬁes the trend induced by demographic diﬀerentials.
The second notable feature of the quantitative experiment is that ﬁscal deﬁcits operate as
an ampliﬁcation mechanism on top of the trend generated by demographic factors.
29Fiscal policy diﬀerentials cause the three major swings in the simulated trade balance which
replicate quite closely the ﬂuctuations in the observed trend during the last twenty ﬁve years.
It is important to stress that ﬁscal policy diﬀerentials, rather than absolute magnitudes,
are the ultimate determinant of the equilibrium trade balance. In a two-country world,
ﬁscal deﬁcits in the Home country do not necessarily entail a Home country trade deﬁcit.
Absent demographic diﬀerentials, a ﬁscal deﬁcit could be accompanied by a trade surplus
simply because ﬁscal policy in the Foreign country is relatively more expansionary. This
consideration bears the consequence that ﬁscal policy alone can hardly be the main driving
force behind the realized U.S. trade deﬁcit vis-a-vis the G6. Diﬀerential ﬁscal stances in the
data are simply too small to support large trade deﬁcits, as already pointed out in section 2.
The bottom line of the analysis is that it is possible to reconcile the persistent U.S. trade
deﬁcits with the conduct of ﬁscal policy in the last twenty ﬁve years once demographic
dynamics are properly taken into account. In this scenario, the overall picture of the U.S.
trade balance vis-a-vis the G6 becomes fairly reasonable.
Result #3. The behavior of the real interest rate is broadly consistent with the data.
The demographic transition and the ﬁscal policy decisions in both regions carry important
implications for the equilibrium world interest rate.
Figure 7 compares the world interest rate generated by the model as an outcome of the
simulation discussed above with the data on the ex-post real interest rate for the G7 (from
the IMF International Financial Statistics Database).
Contrary to the trade balance, the real interest rate is determined by global variables. The
ﬁrst lesson from Figure 7 is that demographic factors also play a critical role in accounting for
the declining trend in the real interest rate. The excess savings associated with the increase
in life expectancy at the world level drives the real interest rate downward. Second, ﬁscal
deﬁcits lead to an increase of the interest rate but the quantitative contribution is indeed
modest.
These results shed new light on the empirical (lack of) relationship between ﬁscal deﬁcits
and interest rates. Evans [1987] suggests that the absence of high interest rates in periods
of substantial ﬁscal deﬁcits, both for the U.S. and at the international level, supports the
hypothesis of Ricardian equivalence.27 The analysis in this paper implies that, even if ﬁscal
deﬁcits do trigger a positive response of the real interest rate, the failure to control for
demographic trends might substantially bias the results.
27See also Elmendorf and Mankiw [1999] for a critical review of the literature on this theme.





























































Figure 7: the real interest rate - simulation and data.
Decreasing real interest rates generally favor deﬁcits by reducing the cost of borrowing and
maintaining a low burden of outstanding debt. This mechanism constitutes an intertemporal
valuation eﬀect for both net foreign debt and government debt which increases the persistence
of existing deﬁcits.
Figure 8 illustrates the valuation mechanism associated with low interest rates with two
simple examples.
The left panel reports the response of the trade balance to an increase in life expectancy
in the case of a two-country world and in the case of a small open economy which faces a
constant interest rate. In the two-country model, the demographic shock hits the Foreign
economy (γ∗ increases from 0.8t o0 .85 over 10 years) and generates a trade deﬁcit in the
Home country according to the mechanism discussed in the previous sections. For a small
open economy, the same demographic transition generates a trade deﬁcit in the rest of the
world which, in this case, represents the Home country. The simulation shows that the general
equilibrium eﬀects associated with the interest rate absorb on impact half of the adjustment
in the trade balance. Moreover, a decreasing interest rate implies that the trade balance is
more persistent and that the rebalancing towards the new steady state occurs more gradually
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Figure 8: general equilibrium effects.
given the reduced burden of foreign debt.28
The right panel of Figure 8 displays the adjustment of the domestic tax rate after a perma-
nent ﬁscal expansion in the Home country (b increases from 26% to 60% over 12 years) with
and without demographic transition. The demographic transition consists of an increase in
the probability of surviving γ from 0.8t o0 .85 over 10 years. The low interest rate associated
with the demographic transition reduces the burden of outstanding public debt. Therefore,
during the expansion, the government of the Home country can aﬀord a larger reduction
of the tax rate. In the new steady state, the tax rate for an economy that experiences a
demographic transition is 1% lower than in the case of stationary demographics. This eﬀect
is indeed quantitatively relevant if one considers that the demographic transition occurs over
a ten-year horizon and only leads to an increase of 1.5 years in life expectancy.
28In this experiment, the unilateral demographic transition leads the Home country to run a long run trade
surplus that compensates the accumulation of net foreign debt experienced along the transition.



























































Figure 9: extended series for net government debt.
6.1 Alternative Scenarios
The choice of the parameter values for the numerical experiments is fairly standard.29 In this
section, I discuss the sensitivity of the quantitative exercise presented above to alternative
assumptions about the exogenous processes and the convergence scenarios.
In Figure 9, I extend the series for net government debt back to 1970 using data on gross
government debt from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Eco-
nomic Outlook Database). By itself, gross debt represents a less appropriate ﬁscal indicator
than net debt for it includes holdings of government bonds by various branches of the public
administration and hence overestimates the impact of public debt on private sector decisions.
The inference of net debt from the gross stance conveys some degree of uncertainty associated
with diﬀerent national accounting standards and institutional frameworks, especially in G6
countries. Finally, for some countries such as France, Italy and U.K., data availability at
the beginning of the sample is an issue also for the gross debt series, posing some additional
problems in terms of extrapolation.
29Gertler [1999] analyzes the sensitivity of the steady state interest rate and capital stock to alternative values
for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and ﬁnds a negative relationship between such parameter and
the steady state interest rate. A low value of this elasticity also reinforces the crowding out eﬀect of ﬁscal
policy on the capital stock.


































Figure 10: alternative scenarios - debt series.
Despite these limitations in terms of the data, the simulation under the extended govern-
ment debt series adds an interesting element to the analysis to the extent that it permits to
illustrate the eﬀects of a non-symmetric initial steady state.
Figure 10 displays the simulated trade balance (in percentage of GDP) for the baseline
scenario and for the case of the extended debt series. If the stock of debt is diﬀerent across
countries in the initial steady state, the country with higher debt experiences a trade surplus.
The steady state eﬀect of debt diﬀerentials corresponds to a shift in the initial condition
for the dynamics of net foreign debt. As the ﬁnal steady state coincide with the benchmark
experiment, the initial diﬀerence vanishes as time goes by. Qualitatively, the dynamic evo-
lution of the trade balance appears to be unaﬀected. The model still generates a downward
trend in the trade balance broadly consistent with the data, although of reduced magnitudes.
Interestingly, the relative U.S. ﬁscal consolidation during the 1990s is now associated with a
smaller correction in the trade deﬁcits, due to the faster adjustment in relative savings.
Finally, while the steady state relative debt diﬀers across countries, the total stock is basi-
cally unchanged with respect to the baseline scenario. Hence, the behavior of the equilibrium
interest rate bears no consequences on the diﬀerent evolution of the trade balance.
34Table 3. convergence scenarios
population growth rate life expectancy
u.s. g6
high 0.3% 83 87
medium 0.2% 80 83
low 0.1% 78 80
A second aspect that requires some additional considerations concerns the values chosen
for population growth rates and population aging in the ﬁnal steady state. In the baseline
experiment, the economy reaches the ﬁnal steady state in 2030 with a population growth rate
equal to 0.2%, which represents the average of the U.S. and G6 projected growth rates for the
period 2030−2050. The U.N. projections however display signiﬁcant cross-country diﬀerences
for several additional years. Under the current estimates, convergence is predicted to occur
only in 2200. The purpose of this part is to evaluate the eﬀects of diﬀerent assumptions
about convergence. To be speciﬁc, besides the baseline (medium) scenario, I also consider
the possibility that convergence occurs at higher (0.3%) or lower (0.1%) population growth
rates. Similarly, I evaluate the eﬀects of a ﬁnal steady state in which population aging is less
(more) pronounced and the two regions display smaller (larger) life expectancy diﬀerentials
(78−80 and 83−87 for the U.S. and the G6 respectively). Table 3 summarizes the possible
combinations. The benchmark experiment of the previous section is based on the “medium”
scenario.
The results of the robustness analysis are reported in Figure 11. The left panel shows the
trade balance under alternative assumptions for the population growth rate in the new steady
state. The right panel displays the results in the case of diﬀerent scenarios for life expectancy.
Alternative values of population growth rates shift the trade balance series roughly by
the size of the diﬀerence (0.1%). The reason is that, in the full demographic transition,
diﬀerentials in population growth rates operate mostly in the investment sector through
contemporaneous ﬂows of capital towards the region that grows at a faster rate.
The relationship between diﬀerent patterns of population aging and the adjustment of the
trade balance contains two main points. First, if life expectancy is higher in the new steady
state, the adjustment of the trade balance is more pronounced. This result is fairly obvious
and follows naturally from the analysis in the previous sections. Second, since the case of long
life expectancy also involves larger steady state diﬀerentials, the trend component induced by
































































Figure 11: alternative scenarios - demographic variables.
demographic factors dominates even more clearly over the short run ﬂuctuations generated
by ﬁscal policy.
I conclude this section with a ﬁnal comment on the assumption of perfect foresight. In this
paper, following the typical approach adopted in large scale OLG models, I have considered
no aggregate uncertainty. While U.N. projections for the demographic transition are avail-
able until 2050, it seems unlikely that agents completely discount the exact aging proﬁle and
population growth rates in their saving and investment decisions. Perhaps even more impor-
tantly, the quantitative importance of ﬁscal deﬁcits in determining the trade balance might
change if aggregate uncertainty about government policy is considered. In the context of this
work, I have decided to preserve the analytical tractability of the framework, perhaps at the
cost of sacriﬁcing the quantitative accuracy of some experiments. Given that agents in this
economy perfectly anticipate the future movements of aggregate exogenous variables, it seems
safe to anticipate that the inclusion of aggregate uncertainty would lead to less smoothing
and more pronounced movements in the trade balance due to unexpected innovations.
367C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has stressed the importance of demographic factors to explain the behavior of the
U.S. trade balance vis-a-vis the G6 in the last three decades.
The main idea contends that demographic diﬀerentials explain the negative and declining
trend in the U.S. external position. In the context of a tractable life-cycle model, I have illus-
trated analytically and quantitatively how relative savings adjust in response to expectations
of longer lifetime horizons. Saving diﬀerentials represent the driving force in accounting for
capital ﬂows from the G6 towards the U.S.
The second result of the paper is that, in an environment in which ﬁscal policy entails
non-Ricardian eﬀects, the demographic transition limits the rebalancing impact of ﬁscal con-
solidations and ampliﬁes the expansionary consequences of ﬁscal deﬁcits. The theoretical
analysis demonstrates that the cross-country diﬀerentials of ﬁscal stances, rather than their
absolute values, constitute the main determinant of trade imbalances. The quantitative ex-
periments support the heuristic evidence that the ﬁscal diﬀerentials in the data are indeed too
small to generate large movements in the U.S. balance of trade. Nonetheless, ﬁscal deﬁcits
appear to be associated with the major swings in the long run trend of the trade balance.
Finally, the interest rate generated by the model mimics well the declining trend observed
in the data. The global excess of savings due to longer retirement periods leads to decreasing
returns in ﬁnancial markets which contribute to increase the persistence of deﬁcits by reducing
the burden of debt and lowering the cost of borrowing.
The analytical tractability of the model should prove useful to investigate a number of
problems. For example, the heterogeneity of the population might deliver interesting insights
for the study of optimal ﬁscal policy with distortionary tax instruments. Another possible
application could analyze the welfare costs of ﬁscal rules, in relation to the current debate in
the European Monetary Union. These questions are left for future research.
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40A Analytical Appendix
The ﬁrst appendix describes the solution of the individual maximization problem and the
characterization of the steady state.
A.1 The Individual Problem
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to asset accumulation for a retiree born in period j












































where σ ≡ (1 − ρ)
−1. I can solve for the policy function of a retiree by guessing that con-





























On the other hand, from the budget constraint of a retiree, one can substitute for consumption
from [42] and express assets as
A
jkr




















If I plug back the result into the Euler equation, it follows that the marginal propensity to


















































The problem of a worker born in period j w h oi se m p l o y e di np e r i o dt is slightly more














































































where the last result is driven by the fact that individuals are risk neutral with respect to labor
income ﬂuctuations and hence choose the same asset proﬁle independently of the employment
status. I can then use the Envelope condition for retirees with the further adjustment that
workers do not turn their wealth over to the mutual fund and hence do not receive the





































































I further deﬁne the ratio of the quantity








The Euler equation can then be rearranged to give
ωC
jw


































t represents the present discounted value of current and future human wealth































































































If I substitute this result back into the Euler equation, I can show that the marginal propensity
to consume for a worker evolves according to




Finally, I can verify the validity of the original guess for the value function [46]. The following






































44I can also observe that ∆r
t+1/∆w
t+1 =  
−(1/ρ)
t and that




This concludes the characterization of the individual problem in the model.
A.2 The Steady State
In this section, I characterize the stationary symmetric steady state of the model. Symmetry
implies that the stock of net foreign assets and the trade balance are zero.
For retirees and workers, it suﬃces to describe the steady state value of their respective
marginal propensities to consume. For a given level of the world interest rate, the marginal




π =1− βσ (ΩRW)
σ−1 , (51)
where




  = ξ/π. (53)
At this point, I prove two results related to the individual marginal propensities to consume.
First, I want to show that in steady state,  >1. To see this, suppose the contrary is true
(  ≤ 1). Taking the ratio of [50] and [51] gives
γ ≥ Ωσ−1 =
h





Since γ<1, the last condition is satisﬁed only if  >1 which constitutes a contradiction.
For a given level of the world interest rate, the system of equations [50]-[53] determine the
solution of the individual marginal propensities to consume and for the variables Ω and  .
Second, I show that in steady state, for a given interest rate, the probability of surviving
has a negative eﬀect on the marginal propensity to consume for workers. To see this, I can




















In order to sign the eﬀect of γ on π (for a given RW), I can just apply the implicit function
theorem to the function
F (γ,π)=π − 1+βσ [Ω(γ,π)RW]
σ−1 .





















which implies a negative eﬀect of population aging on the marginal propensity to consume for
workers, holding ﬁxed the world interest rate. I now return to the description of the steady
state equations.
From the production function it is easy to see that
y = k1−α (54)
The ﬁrm ﬁrst order condition for capital pins down the capital-ouput ratio for a given level
of the world return












Investment is a constant share of the capital stock to compensate for depreciation and pop-
46ulation growth
i =( x + n + δ)k. (56)
Again, for a given level of the world interest rate, the solution for capital, output and invest-
ment can be retrieved from the system of equations [54]-[56].
As a second step, I consider aggregate consumption and the distribution of assets. The
equation for aggregate consumption [22] yields
c = π{[1 + (  − 1)λ]RWa + h}. (57)
In steady state, the distribution of wealth across cohorts is determined by
λ =
(1 − ω)
(1 + x + n) − ω(1 − ξ)RW
.
The expression for λ can also be readjusted as to make explicit the dependence on the ratio
of retirees to workers in the population
λ =
(1 + n − γ)ψ







Given that the dependency ratio is only a function of exogenous parameters, the steady state
distribution of wealth only depends on the level of the interest rate. The capitalized value of
human wealth that enter the steady state consumption function is
h =
(α − τ)y
1 − ω(1 + x)/ΩRW
. (60)
In a symmetric steady state, net foreign assets are equal to zero so that total assets are given
by
a = k + by. (61)
From the government budget constraint, taxes equal expenditure plus the net interest rate
payment on the stock of steady state debt
τ = g +[ RW − (1 + x + n)]b. (62)
The system of equations [57]-[62] determines the demand side of the model in steady state
47for a given interest rate, which can be derived from the resource constraint
(1 − g)y = c + i, (63)
given the steady state value of the stock of government debt b and of government spending
g.
The algorithm of solution for the steady state corresponds to the one described in the text
and the practical implementation is carried out using DYNARE.
B Data Appendix
In this appendix, I provide the details about the data used in this paper and the methodology
to construct aggregates for the G6.
The series for the U.S. trade balance (versus the rest of the world and versus the G6)
are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (International Transactions) and are expressed
in percentage of GDP (same source, NIPA Tables). Since bilateral trade data for France,
Germany and Italy are available only starting in 1986, I proxy the G6 series using Western
Europe plus Canada and Japan for the period 1960 − 1966 and the EU 6 (Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands) plus Canada, Japan and United Kingdom for
the period 1966 − 1985. All series are expressed in current U.S. dollars. The trend for the
U.S. trade balance vis-a-vis the G6 in percentage of GDP is the long run component of the
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered series.
The data used to construct real GDP growth rates (per capita and per worker) are from
the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGCD). All values are expressed in PPP
at 2002 U.S. dollars. Since total GDP is expressed in the same unit for all countries, I create
as e r i e sf o rt h eG 6G D Pb ys i m p l ys u m m i n gG D Pa c r o s sc o u n t r i e s .
The data on historical and projected demographic trends are from United Nations World
Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision. Although availability dates back to 1950, I use
data and projections for the period 1970 − 2050. Population growth rates for the G6 are
computed after aggregating total population across countries. The years of life expectancy,
the dependency ratio and the fertility rate are a population-weighted average of the national
counterparts.
The data for ﬁscal policy are from the International Monetary Fund (World Economic
Outlook Database) and cover the period 1980−2004. I use PPP conversion factors from the
48same source to express the levels of net government debt and total government deﬁcit in each
G6 member in 2000 U.S. dollars. I then aggregate across countries and divide by the series of
GDP constructed along the same lines. The data for gross government debt used to extend
the series for net debt back to 1970 are from the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (Economic Outlook Database). The aggregate for the G6 is constructed
adopting the same methodology just described above.
Finally, the data used to construct the world interest rate are from the International Mon-
etary Fund (International Financial Statistics) for the period 1980−2004. For each country,
I compute the ex-post real interest rate by subtracting the realized CPI inﬂation rate from
the available long term (generally 10-year) government bond yield. The “world” interest rate
is computed using population weights30.
30Aggregation using GDP weights delivers almost identical results.
49